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Abstract
The subsignatures of a system with continuous and exchangeable component
lifetimes form a class of indexes ranging from the Samaniego signature to the
Barlow-Proschan importance index. These indexes can be computed through
explicit linear expressions involving the values of the structure function of the
system. We show how the subsignatures can be computed more eciently
from the reliability function of the system via identications of variables,
dierentiations, and integrations.
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1. Introduction
Consider an n-component system (C; ), where C is the set f1; : : : ; ng
of its components and  : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1g is its structure function which
expresses the state of the system in terms of the states of its components. We
assume that the system is semicoherent, which means that  is nondecreasing
in each variable and satises the conditions (0; : : : ; 0) = 0 and (1; : : : ; 1) =
1. We also assume that the components have continuous and exchangeable
lifetimes T1; : : : ; Tn.
Marichal (2014) recently introduced the concept of subsignature of a
system as follows. Let M be a nonempty subset of the set C of compo-
nents and let m = jM j. The M-signature of the system is the m-tuple
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sM = (s
(1)
M ; : : : ; s
(m)
M ), where s
(k)
M is the probability that the k-th failure among
the components in M causes the system to fail. That is,
s
(k)
M = Pr(TS = Tk:M); k 2 f1; : : : ;mg ;
where TS and Tk:M denote, respectively, the lifetime of the system and the
k-th smallest lifetime of the components in M , i.e., the k-th order statis-
tic obtained by rearranging the variables Ti (i 2 M) in ascending order of
magnitude. A subsignature of the system is anM -signature for someM  C.
WhenM = C theM -signature reduces to the signature s = (s1; : : : ; sn) of
the system, a concept introduced by Samaniego (1985) to compare dierent
system designs and to easily compute the reliability of any system.1 WhenM
is a singleton fjg the M -signature reduces to the 1-tuple s(1)fjg = Pr(TS = Tj),
which is the Barlow-Proschan index for component j, a concept introduced
by Barlow and Proschan (1975) to measure the importance of the compo-
nents. Thus, the subsignatures dene a class of 2n   1 indexes that range
from the standard signature (when M = C) to the Barlow-Proschan index
(when M is a singleton).
The M -signature of a system can be computed through any of the fol-
lowing explicit formulas (see Marichal, 2014):2
s
(k)
M =
X
AC
jM\Aj=m k+1
m  k + 1
n
 
n 1
jAj 1
 (A)  X
AC
jM\Aj=m k
k
n
 
n 1
jAj
 (A) ; (1)
s
(k)
M =
X
j2M
X
ACnfjg
jMnAj=k
1
n
 
n 1
jAj
  (A [ fjg)  (A) : (2)
Equations (1) and (2) show that, under the exchangeable assumption, the
subsignatures do not depend on the distribution of the variables T1; : : : ; Tn
1Actually, Samaniego (1985) proved that, when the component lifetimes are indepen-
dent and identically distributed, the system reliability can always be expressed as the sum
of the order statistics distributions weighted by the signature s; this result was then estab-
lished by Navarro and Rychlik (2007) in the more general case of exchangeable lifetimes.
2Here and throughout we identify Boolean vectors x 2 f0; 1gn and subsets A 
f1; : : : ; ng by setting xi = 1 if and only if i 2 A. We thus use the same symbol to
denote both a function f : f0; 1gn ! R and its corresponding set function f : 2f1;:::;ng ! R
interchangeably.
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but only on the structure function. When M = C, formula (1) reduces to
Boland's formula (Boland, 2001)
sk =
X
AC
jAj=n k+1
1 
n
jAj
 (A)  X
AC
jAj=n k
1 
n
jAj
 (A) :
When M = fjg, formula (2) reduces to Shapley-Shubik's formula (Shapley,
1953; Shapley and Shubik, 1954)
I
(j)
BP =
X
ACnfjg
1
n
 
n 1
jAj
  (A [ fjg)  (A) : (3)
The computation of the subsignatures by means of Eqs. (1) and (2) may be
cumbersome and tedious for large systems since it requires the evaluation
of (A) for every A  C. To overcome this issue, in this paper we show
how these indexes can be computed from simple manipulations of the re-
liability function of the structure  such as identications of variables and
dierentiations.
Recall that the reliability function of the structure  is the multilinear
function h : [0; 1]n ! R dened by
h(x) = h(x1; : : : ; xn) =
X
AC
(A)
Y
i2A
xi
Y
i2CnA
(1  xi): (4)
When the component lifetimes are independent, this function expresses the
reliability of the system in terms of the component reliabilities; see Barlow
and Proschan (1981, Chap. 2) for a background on reliability functions and
Ramamurthy (1990, Section 3.2) for a more recent reference. It is easy to
see that this function can always be put in the standard multilinear form
h(x) =
X
AC
d(A)
Y
i2A
xi ; (5)
where the link between the coecients d(A) and the values (A) is given
through the conversion formulas
d(A) =
X
BA
( 1)jAj jBj (B) and (A) =
X
BA
d(B) :
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Example 1. The structure of a system consisting of two components con-
nected in parallel is given by
(x1; x2) = max(x1; x2) = x1 q x2 = x1 + x2   x1x2 ;
where q is the (associative) coproduct operation dened by x q y = 1  
(1   x)(1   y). Considering only the multilinear expression of function ,
one immediately obtains the corresponding reliability function h(x1; x2) =
x1 + x2   x1x2.
For any function f of n variables, we denote its diagonal section f(x; : : : ; x)
simply by f(x). For instance, from Eqs. (4) and (5) we derive
h(x) =
X
AC
(A)xjAj (1  x)n jAj =
X
AC
d(A)xjAj :
Owen (1972) observed that the right-hand expression in Eq. (3), which is
the Barlow-Proschan index for component j, can be computed by integrating
over [0; 1] the diagonal section of the j-th partial derivative of h. That is,
I
(j)
BP =
Z 1
0
(@jh)(t) dt : (6)
Thus, this formula provides a simple way to compute I
(j)
BP from the reliability
function h (at least simpler than the use of Eq. (3)). As a by-product, from
Eq. (6) we easily derive the following integral formula
nX
j=1
I
(j)
BP xj =
Z 1
0
d
dt
h
 
t x1 + z(1  x1); : : : ; t xn + z(1  xn)

z=t
dt :
Example 2. Consider the bridge structure as indicated in Figure 1. The
corresponding structure and reliability functions are respectively given by
(x1; : : : ; x5) = x1 x4 q x2 x5 q x1 x3 x5 q x2 x3 x4
and
h(x1; : : : ; x5) = x1x4 + x2x5 + x1x3x5 + x2x3x4
  x1x2x3x4   x1x2x3x5   x1x2x4x5   x1x3x4x5   x2x3x4x5
+ 2 x1x2x3x4x5 :
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By using Eq. (6) we immediately obtain (I
(1)
BP; : : : ; I
(5)
BP) =
 
7
30
; 7
30
; 1
15
; 7
30
; 7
30

.
Indeed, we have for instance
I
(3)
BP =
Z 1
0
(@3h)(t) dt =
Z 1
0
(2t2   4t3 + 2t4) dt = 1
15
:
2
1
3
5
4
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Figure 1: Bridge structure
Remark 1. Example 2 illustrates the fact that the reliability function h can be
easily obtained from the minimal path sets of the system simply by expanding
the coproducts in  and then simplifying the resulting polynomial expression
(using x2i = xi).
Similarly to Owen's method, in this note we provide a simple way to
compute the system subsignatures only from the reliability function h(x),
thus avoiding formulas (1) and (2) which require the evaluation of (A) for
every A  C.
When M is a singleton, our method reduces to Owen's. When M = C,
it reduces to the following algorithm (obtained in Marichal, 2014a) for the
computation of the Samaniego signature.
Let f be a univariate polynomial of degree 6 n,
f(x) = an x
n +   + a1 x+ a0 :
The n-reected of f is the polynomial Rnf dened by
(Rnf)(x) = a0 x
n + a1 x
n 1 +   + an ;
or equivalently, (Rnf)(x) = xn f(1=x).
Algorithm 1. The following algorithm inputs the number n of components
and the reliability function h(x) and outputs the signature s of the system.
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Step 1. Let g(x) = Dh(x) be the derivative of h(x).
Step 2. For every k 2 f1; : : : ; ng, let ck 1 be the coecient of xk 1
in the (n   1)-degree polynomial (Rn 1g)(x + 1) = (x +
1)n 1 g
 
1
x+1

.
Step 3. We have sk = ck 1=(k
 
n
k

) for k = 1; : : : ; n.
Even though such an algorithm can be easily executed by hand for small
n, a computer algebra system can be of great assistance for large n.
Example 3. Consider the bridge structure as indicated in Figure 1. For this
structure we have
h(x) = 2x2 + 2x3   5x4 + 2x5; g(x) = 4x+ 6x2   20x3 + 10x4 ;
and
(R4g)(x) = 10  20x+ 6x2 + 4x3:
It follows that (R4g)(x + 1) = 4x + 18x2 + 4x3 and hence s =
 
0; 1
5
; 3
5
; 1
5
; 0

.
Indeed, we have for instance s3 = c2=(3
 
5
3

) = 3
5
.
Denoting the coecient of xk 1 in the polynomial f(x) by [xk 1]f(x),
Algorithm 1 can be summarized into the single equation (see Marichal, 2014a)
sk =
1
k
 
n
k
 [xk 1] (Rn 1Dh)(x+ 1) ; k = 1; : : : ; n :
This note is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide an algorithm
which subsumes both Owen's method and Algorithm 1 for the computation
of the system subsignatures from the reliability function. We also show how
to compute generating functions of subsignatures. In Section 3 we discuss
the concept of M -signature in the special case where M is a modular set of
the system.
2. An algorithm for the computation of subsignatures
We now present our main result, namely an algorithm for the computation
of the system subsignatures from the reliability function.
Algorithm 2. The following algorithm inputs a subset M of m components
and the reliability function h(x) and outputs the M -signature sM of the
system.
6
Step 1. Let h(x; z) be the bivariate polynomial obtained from the
reliability function h(x) by identifying to x the variables in
M and identifying to z the variables in C nM .
Step 2. Let g(x; z) = @x h(x; z).
Step 3. For every k 2 f1; : : : ;mg, let ck 1(z) be the coecient of
xk 1 in the polynomial (Rm 11 g)(x+1; z) = (x+1)
m 1 g
 
1
x+1
; z

,
where Rm 11 g is the (m 1)-reected of g with respect to its
rst argument.
Step 4. We have s
(k)
M =
R 1
0
tm k (1  t)k 1 ck 1(t) dt for k = 1; : : : ;m.
Proof of Algorithm 2. By Eq. (4) we have
h(x) =
X
AC
(A)
Y
i2M\A
xi
Y
i2MnA
(1  xi)
Y
i2AnM
xi
Y
i2Cn(A[M)
(1  xi) :
It follows that
h(x; z) =
X
AC
(A) xjM\Aj (1  x)jMnAj zjAnM j (1  z)n jAj jMnAj ;
g(x; z) =
X
AC
(A) jM \ AjxjM\Aj 1 (1  x)jMnAj zjAnM j (1  z)n jAj jMnAj
 
X
AC
(A) jM n AjxjM\Aj (1  x)jMnAj 1 zjAnM j (1  z)n jAj jMnAj ;
and
(Rm 11 g)(x+ 1; z) =
X
AC
(A) jM \ AjxjMnAj zjAnM j (1  z)n jAj jMnAj
 
X
AC
(A) jM n AjxjMnAj 1 zjAnM j (1  z)n jAj jMnAj :
Let k 2 f1; : : : ;mg. The coecient of xk 1 in the polynomial (Rm 11 g)(x +
1; z) is then given by
ck 1(z) =
X
AC
jMnAj=k 1
(A) jM \ Aj zjAnM j (1  z)n jAj jMnAj
 
X
AC
jMnAj=k
(A) jM n Aj zjAnM j (1  z)n jAj jMnAj :
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Thus we have
tm k (1  t)k 1 ck 1(t) =
X
AC
jM\Aj=m k+1
(A) (m  k + 1) tjAj 1 (1  t)n jAj
 
X
AC
jM\Aj=m k
(A) k tjAj (1  t)n jAj 1 :
By integrating the right-hand side over [0; 1] and then using the classical
identity Z 1
0
tp (1  t)q dt = 1
(p+ q + 1)
 
p+q
p
 ; p; q 2 N ; (7)
we precisely obtain the right-hand side of Eq. (1). This completes the proof.
As mentioned in the introduction, the signature s of the system can
be computed by Algorithm 1. Although this algorithm was established in
Marichal (2014a), we now show how it can be easily derived from Algo-
rithm 2.
Proof of Algorithm 1. We only need to prove Step 3. Using Step 4 in Al-
gorithm 2 and then Eq. (7), we see that sk = ck 1
R 1
0
tn k (1   t)k 1 dt =
ck 1=(k
 
n
k

) for every k = 1; : : : ; n, which is sucient.
Algorithm 2 shows that theM -signature can be computed from the bivari-
ate polynomial h(x; z) without the full knowledge of the reliability function
h(x). Thus, two n-component systems having the same bivariate polynomial
h(x; z) also have the same M -signature.
The following proposition provides explicit expressions for the coecient
ck 1(z) in terms of the coecients of (x 1)i and xi in g(x; z). The expression
given in Eq. (8) is particularly interesting for small values of k, while that in
Eq. (9) is interesting for small values of m  k. For instance, we obtain
c0(z) = g(1; z) and cm 1(z) = g(0; z) :
8
Proposition 1. Let g(x; z) and ck 1(z) be the functions dened in Algo-
rithm 2. Then we have
ck 1(z) =
k 1X
i=0
( 1)i

m  1  i
m  k
 
[(x  1)i] g(x; z) ; (8)
ck 1(z) =
m kX
i=0

m  1  i
k   1
 
[xi] g(x; z)

; (9)
where [(x  1)i] g(x; z) = 1
i!
(@i1g)(1; z) and [x
i] g(x; z) = 1
i!
(@i1g)(0; z).
Proof. We clearly have g(x; z) =
Pm 1
i=0
 
[(x  1)i] g(x; z) (x  1)i and hence
(Rm 11 g)(x+ 1; z) =
m 1X
i=0
 
[(x  1)i] g(x; z) ( 1)i (x+ 1)m 1 i
=
m 1X
i=0
 
[(x  1)i] g(x; z) ( 1)i m 1 iX
j=0

m  1  i
j

xm 1 j
=
m 1X
j=0
xm 1 j
m 1 jX
i=0
( 1)i

m  1  i
j
 
[(x  1)i] g(x; z) :
Considering the coecient of xk 1 in the latter expression leads to for-
mula (8). Formula (9) can be established similarly.
The following proposition gives an explicit expression for the generating
function
Pm
k=1 s
(k)
M x
k of the M -signature in terms of the reliability function
h(x). Thus, it provides an alternative way to compute the M -signature.
Proposition 2. Let g(x; z) be the function dened in Algorithm 2. Then we
have
mX
k=1
s
(k)
M x
k =
Z 1
0
xRm 1t
 
(Rm 11 g)((t  1)x+ 1; z)

z=t
dt ;
where Rm 1t denotes the (m   1)-reection with respect to variable t. In
particular,
mX
k=1
s
(k)
M =
X
j2M
I
(j)
BP =
Z 1
0
g(t; t) dt :
9
Proof. By denition of the polynomial Rm 11 g in Algorithm 2 we have that
mX
k=1
ck 1(z) tk 1 xk 1 = (Rm 11 g)(t x+ 1; z) :
Multiplying through by x, replacing t by t   1, and then applying Rm 1t to
both sides, we obtain
mX
k=1
ck 1(z) tm k (1  t)k 1 xk = xRm 1t
 
(Rm 11 g)((t  1)x+ 1; z)

:
We then conclude by using Step 4 in Algorithm 2. The particular case can
be derived from the main result by setting x = 1.
From Proposition 2 we immediately derive the following algorithm for the
computation of the generating function of the M -signature. An advantage of
this algorithm over Algorithm 2 is that it provides the M -signature without
computing all the coecients ck 1(z).
Algorithm 3. The following algorithm inputs a subset M of m components
and the reliability function h(x) and outputs the generating function of the
M -signature sM of the system.
Step 1. Let h(x; z) be the bivariate polynomial obtained from the
reliability function h(x) by identifying to x the variables in
M and identifying to z the variables in C nM .
Step 2. Let g(x; z) = @x h(x; z).
Step 3. Let f(t; x; z) = x (Rm 11 g)((t  1)x+ 1; z).
Step 4. We have
Pm
k=1 s
(k)
M x
k =
R 1
0
(Rm 11 f)(t; x; t) dt.
Example 4. Let us consider again the bridge structure as indicated in Fig-
ure 1 and let us compute the generating function of the corresponding M -
signature for M = f1; 2; 3g. We have
h(x; z) = 2xz + 2x2z   2x3z   3x2z2 + 2x3z2 ;
g(x; z) = 2z + 4xz   6x2z   6xz2 + 6x2z2 ;
f(t; x; z) =  8x2z + 8tx2z + 2x3z   4tx3z + 2t2x3z + 6x2z2   6tx2z2 ;
and nally
P3
k=1 s
(k)
M x
k = 11
30
x2 + 1
6
x3. Thus sM = (0;
11
30
; 1
6
).
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3. Subsignatures associated with modular sets
Suppose that the system contains a module (M;), where M  C is
the corresponding modular set and  : f0; 1gM ! f0; 1g is the corresponding
structure function. In this case the structure function of the system expresses
through the composition
(x) =  
 
(xM);xCnM

; (10)
where xM = (xi)i2M and xCnM = (xi)i2CnM . The reduced system (of n m+1
components) obtained from the original system (C; ) by considering the
modular setM as a single macro-component [M ] will be denoted by (CM ;  ),
where CM = (C nM) [ f[M ]g and  : f0; 1gCM ! f0; 1g is the organizing
structure. For general background on modules, see Barlow and Proschan
(1981, Chap. 1).
Denote by TM the lifetime of the module and by s
M the signature of
the module as an m-component system, that is, the m-tuple whose k-th
coordinate is given by sMk = Pr(TM = Tk:M) for k = 1; : : : ;m.
The following theorem shows that s
(k)
M factorizes into the product of s
M
k
and the expected value of the function (@[M ]h )(t) with respect to a certain
beta distribution, where h : [0; 1]
CM ! R is the reliability function of the
structure  . When M is a singleton, this result reduces to Owen's formula
(6).
This result was established in Marichal (2014, Cor. 16). Here we give a
simpler proof based on Algorithms 1 and 2.
Theorem 3. For every nonempty modular set M  C and every k 2
f1; : : : ;mg, we have
s
(k)
M = s
M
k
Z 1
0
rk;m(t) (@[M ]h )(t) dt ;
where rk;m(t) is the p.d.f. of the beta distribution on [0; 1] with parameters
 = m  k + 1 and  = k.
Proof. We prove the result by using Algorithm 2. Let h : [0; 1]
M ! R be the
reliability function of . By Eq. (10) we then have h(x) = h 
 
h(x
M);xCnM

.
Since @[M ]h does not depend upon its [M ]-variable, by the chain rule we have
g(x; z) =
d
dx
h 
 
h(x); z

= g(x) (@[M ]h )(z) ;
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where g(x) = Dh(x). Thus, for every k 2 f1; : : : ;mg, we have
ck 1(z) = [xk 1](Rm 11 g)(x+ 1; z) = (@[M ]h )(z) [x
k 1](Rm 11 g)(x+ 1) :
But by Algorithm 1, we have [xk 1](Rm 11 g)(x + 1) = k
 
m
k

sMk . Therefore,
by Algorithm 2, we nally obtain
s
(k)
M = s
M
k k

m
k
 Z 1
0
tm k (1  t)k 1 (@[M ]h )(t) dt ;
where k
 
m
k

= 1=
R 1
0
tm k (1 t)k 1 dt (use Eq. (7)). This proves the theorem.
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